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Experiments	in	the	laboratory	of	populism:	The	2018
Hungarian	election
Parliamentary	elections	will	be	held	in	Hungary	on	8	April.	Theresa	Gessler	and
Johannes	Wachs	preview	the	vote,	noting	that	although	the	governing	Fidesz	party	has	a
sizeable	polling	lead,	the	contest	promises	to	be	closer	than	the	last	parliamentary	election
four	years	ago.
Hungary	has	emerged	as	a	trendsetter	for	Europe’s	populist	right.	As	Prime	Minister	Viktor
Orbán’s	Fidesz	party	seeks	a	third	consecutive	term	on	8	April,	populist	politicians	from	Italy,	France,	and	Poland	cite
him	as	their	prototype.	Despite	its	membership	in	the	European	People’s	Party,	the	party	and	its	leader	have	become
icons	of	the	alt-right	with	their	anti-Brussels	and	anti-refugee	rhetoric.	At	home,	Hungarian	political	discourse	is
following	a	worrisome	trend:	while	four	years	ago	Fidesz	campaigned	primarily	on	its	utility-fee	reductions,	albeit	in
nationalistic	terms,	the	current	campaign	has	taken	on	a	tone	of	civilisational	crisis.	Prime	Minister	Orbán	frames	the
issue	of	refugee	resettlement	as	a	clash	of	civilisations.
Though	Fidesz	holds	a	commanding	lead	in	the	polls	and	is	aided	by	a	fragmented	opposition,	the	election	promises
to	be	closer	than	the	one	four	years	ago.	While	many	Hungarians	support	tough	policies	on	migration,	a	majority	of
the	electorate	are	dissatisfied	with	the	general	direction	of	their	country.	Healthcare	and	political	corruption,	not
migration,	are	cited	as	primary	concerns	by	wide	margins.	The	2018	election	may	also	mark	a	change	in	the	pattern
of	competition	since	the	political	environment	has	also	changed:	Fidesz	has	become	more	populist	and	right-wing
and	Jobbik	has	attempted	to	reinvent	itself	as	a	mainstream	party.	While	the	left	is	as	disorganised	as	ever,	there	is
momentum	towards	electoral	cooperation	in	individual	districts.
The	parties
In	previous	years,	Hungarian	politics	has	been	characterised	by	a	polarised	competition	between	two	camps:	Fidesz
and	everybody	else.	On	the	right,	Fidesz	absorbed	its	competitors	over	the	course	of	the	1990s	and	2000s.	The
exception	is	Jobbik,	which	first	entered	the	parliament	in	2010	and	traditionally	positioned	itself	to	the	right	of	Fidesz.
Though	Fidesz	has	always	presented	itself	as	the	reasonable	party	between	Jobbik	and	parties	on	the	left,	Fidesz
has	moved	to	the	right,	adopting	many	of	the	positions	Jobbik	set	forth	in	2010.
In	contrast,	the	left	of	the	political	spectrum	is	fragmented.	Since	the	2006	re-election	of	the	socialist-liberal
government,	no	left	of	centre	parties	have	won	any	significant	elections	at	the	local,	national,	or	European	levels.	As
a	whole,	the	opposition	has	progressively	fragmented	into	smaller	parties,	several	of	which	are	led	by	former
officeholders	of	the	socialist	party	(MSZP),	including	the	former	Prime	Minister	Ferenc	Gyurcsány’s	Democratic
Coalition	(DK).
While	these	parties	position	themselves	as	alternatives	on	the	left,	the	new	electoral	law,	written	by	Fidesz	after
2010,	awards	a	majority	of	seats	using	the	first-past-the-post	system	in	electoral	districts.	In	2014,	opposition	parties
received	55%	of	the	popular	vote	and	only	33%	of	the	seats	in	parliament.	Given	the	strong	incentives	to	at	least
form	an	electoral	alliance,	only	two	parties	have	maintained	their	electoral	independence	in	the	past:	Jobbik	and
LMP,	a	green	party	whose	name	means	“Politics	can	be	different”.
Figure:	Hungarian	polls	since	the	2010	election
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Note:	The	chart	shows	polling	of	all	Hungarian	voters	since	the	2010	election,	with	the	2014	election	results	for	the	four	main
parties	shown	as	an	X.	Shortly	before	the	2014	election,	several	opposition	parties	formed	an	alliance.	The	chart	excludes	several
parties	who	are	consistently	far	from	the	5%	electoral	threshold	(Momentum,	Együtt,	Liberals).	Source:	kozvelemenykutatok.hu
The	polls	predict	more	of	the	same:	Fidesz	has	held	a	safe	plurality	in	the	polling	since	the	last	election.	Yet	the	large
mass	of	undecided	voters	leaves	room	for	a	surprise.	Many	Hungarians	are	dissatisfied	with	the	government	and	its
management	of	the	country.	In	a	recent	poll,	76%	of	Hungarians	said	their	country	was	heading	in	the	wrong
direction,	a	number	that	has	been	consistently	high	over	the	last	few	years.
A	corruption	scandal	involving	EU	funds	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	son-in-law	has	been	the	focus	of	opposition	media
for	some	time	now.	Good	headline	numbers	on	unemployment	and	the	economy	have	not	translated	into	broad
social	satisfaction.	A	recent	mayoral	election	in	the	traditional	Fidesz	stronghold	of	Hódmezővásárhely	shows	the
potential	of	this	discontent:	Péter	Márki-Zay,	an	independent	candidate	supported	by	all	opposition	parties,	defeated
the	heavily	favoured	Fidesz	candidate.	Tellingly,	Fidesz’s	candidate	received	a	similar	count	of	votes	as	four	years
ago:	the	difference	came	down	to	a	large	increase	in	turnout.	This	surprise	victory	has	given	new	impetus	for	the
opposition	to	cooperate.
Competition	shifts	to	the	right
Prior	to	the	election,	political	competition	has	shifted	further	to	the	right,	particularly	on	cultural	issues.	The	start	of
the	most	intense	phase	of	Hungarian	parliamentary	politics	is	traditionally	the	15	March	national	holiday.	Party
leaders	address	their	supporters	and	frame	the	primary	issues	of	the	campaign	to	come.	These	speeches	provide
insight	into	how	the	parties	tailor	their	message	to	the	campaign	and	how	they	evolve	from	election	to	election.
In	2014,	Prime	Minister	Orbán	dedicated	his	speech	to	praising	the	country’s	unity	and	economic	progress,	and
highlighting	the	need	to	support	families	to	head	off	demographic	challenges.	Though	many	of	the	policy	solutions
had	a	nationalistic	undertone	–	e.g.	the	scheme	to	help	so-called	“victims	of	foreign	exchange	loans”	–	the	campaign
was	based	on	promising	economic	benefits	to	various	social	groups	under	the	slogan	“Hungary	is	doing	better”.
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The	contrast	with	2018	could	not	be	stronger:	Orbán’s	speech	this	year	focused	entirely	on	the	alleged	dangers
posed	by	migration.	The	speech	warned	Hungarians	that	migrants	are	threatening	to	take	away	the	country	–	a
sentiment	that	is	mirrored	in	the	rest	of	the	Fidesz	campaign.	Running	under	the	slogan	“For	us,	Hungary	first”,
echoing	Trump’s	“America	First”,	Fidesz	claims	that	a	network	of	actors	including	the	EU,	“international	speculators”,
opposition	parties,	NGOs,	and	professional	activists	led	by	George	Soros	threatens	the	future	of	Hungary.	Should
this	network	defeat	Fidesz	and	enable	migration	to	Hungary,	Orbán	claims	that	the	result	would	be	like	another
Trianon,	the	treaty	in	which	Hungary	lost	two	thirds	of	its	territory	after	the	First	World	War.	The	government’s	control
over	most	major	media	outlets	also	means	news	reporting	has	prioritised	migration.
This	shift	can	be	interpreted	as	a	strategic	reorientation	of	Fidesz.	Given	the	continued	fragmentation	of	the	left,
Jobbik	has	maintained	its	position	as	second	strongest	party.	While	some	commentators	have	alleged	a	silent
partnership	between	Jobbik	and	Fidesz	in	the	past,	Fidesz	is	now	increasingly	competing	for	voters	on	the	right
rather	than	in	the	centre.	Mobilising	some	of	Jobbik’s	core	topics	such	as	immigration	and	hostility	against	Roma
have	been	clear	steps	in	this	direction,	particularly	since	all	parties	except	Jobbik	had	avoided	the	Roma	issue	in
past	electoral	campaigns.	Indeed,	in	a	recent	campaign	event	Orbán	made	an	analogy	between	the	settlement	of
Roma	in	Miskolc	and	the	threat	of	refugee	resettlement.
In	contrast,	Jobbik	has	employed	the	opposite	strategy	and	to	some	extent	traded	places	with	Fidesz.	Since	the
migration	crisis,	Jobbik	has	increasingly	focused	on	economic	issues,	advocating	EU-wide	minimum	wage	regulation.
In	the	past	year,	the	party	has	focused	on	political	corruption,	labelling	Fidesz	politicians	as	thieves	on	billboards
around	the	country.	Interestingly,	many	of	these	billboards	are	financed	by	Lajos	Simicska,	a	former	friend	of	Orbán
and,	until	2014,	a	key	supporter	of	Fidesz.	Jobbik’s	orientation	towards	the	opposition	was	also	strengthened	by	a
large	fine	imposed	by	the	State	Audit	Office,	which	is	led	by	former	Fidesz	MP	László	Domokos,	that	threatened
Jobbik’s	ability	to	run	in	the	2018	election	and	increased	their	criticism	of	the	Fidesz	government	as	undemocratic.
Electoral	cooperation	on	the	left:	Will	they,	won’t	they?
Given	the	strong	position	enjoyed	by	Fidesz	in	the	polls	and	the	heavily	majoritarian	electoral	system,	all	opposition
parties	agree	on	the	practicality	of	some	kind	of	electoral	cooperation.	The	current	law,	which	was	written	from
scratch	by	Fidesz	following	its	landslide	victory	in	2010,	favours	large	parties	over	coalitions:	106	seats	are	awarded
as	first-past-the-post	to	individual	candidates	in	the	electoral	districts,	and	the	remaining	93	seats	are	awarded
proportionally	to	party	lists.	Many	other	details	of	the	law	favour	Fidesz.
Though	personal	animosities	among	the	opposition	have	majorly	curtailed	electoral	cooperation,	there	are	also
substantive	barriers	to	cooperation.	As	the	electoral	law	prescribes	a	multiplication	of	the	threshold	if	parties	run	with
a	joint	list,	it	is	relatively	unattractive	for	opposition	parties	to	formally	combine	their	lists.	Additionally,	a	recent
decision	by	the	National	Election	Committee	forces	parties	to	withdraw	their	party	list	if	the	party	does	not	field	a
sufficient	number	of	candidates	in	individual	districts.	Thus,	parties	endanger	their	national	list	(and	thereby	their
entry	into	parliament)	if	they	withdraw	too	many	candidates	in	favour	of	other	opposition	parties.
The	MSZP,	Hungary’s	post-communist	centre-left	party,	has	had	a	bumpy	campaign	and	is	no	longer	the	obvious
leader	of	a	coalition,	even	on	the	left.	The	party’s	first	candidate	for	Prime	Minister,	László	Botka,	withdrew	his
candidacy	in	October,	accusing	parts	of	the	party	of	collusion	with	Fidesz.	Perhaps	recognising	its	weakness,	the
party	nominated	Gergely	Karácsony,	mayor	of	a	Budapest	district	and	leader	of	a	smaller	opposition	party	(Dialogue
for	Hungary	–	PM)	as	a	joint	candidate.	MSZP-PM	and	DK,	another	significant	force	on	the	left,	have	coordinated
their	candidacies	in	all	districts.	Though	voters	will	be	able	to	vote	for	either	party	list,	only	one	party’s	candidate	will
be	present	on	the	ballot	in	each	district.	Collaboration	between	this	coalition	and	LMP,	Momentum,	and	Jobbik,	the
remaining	significant	parties,	has	been	much	more	limited,	though	there	is	still	time	for	tactical	coordination.
These	efforts	seek	to	replicate	the	Hódmezővásárhely	formula	for	success:	a	single	opposition	candidate	and	high
turnout.	Though	there	will	be	several	opposition	candidates	on	the	ballot	in	most	districts,	widespread	tactical	voting
for	individual	candidates	bodes	poorly	for	Fidesz.	Voters	reluctant	to	support	leading	opposition	candidates	from
another	party	can	be	consoled	by	voting	for	their	preferred	party	on	the	list	ballot.	The	idea	of	a	united	opposition	has
also	found	civil	society	support.	Beyond	the	opposition	parties,	an	activist	group	called	“The	Country	is	for	All
Movement”	has	commissioned	a	series	of	polls	to	determine	the	most	promising	opposition	nominees	in	competitive
electoral	districts.	Together	with	Péter	Márki-Zay,	the	new	mayor	of	Hódmezővásárhely,	the	group	has	created	a	list
of	what	it	views	as	the	opposition	candidate	(including	Jobbik)	with	the	best	chance	to	defeat	Fidesz.
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Yet	there	are	several	reasons	to	be	sceptical	about	the	potential	of	this	approach.	Convincing	voters	to	cast	ballots
tactically	is	not	easy.	In	nearly	all	districts	there	are	still	multiple	opposition	candidates.	Even	if	agreements	to
withdraw	candidates	are	reached,	the	chosen	candidates	will	have	much	less	time	to	campaign	on	their	own	(i.e.	as
the	sole	alternative	to	the	status-quo)	than	Márki-Zay	did.	Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	there	are	significant	financial
incentives	for	parties	to	field	certain	numbers	of	candidates:	for	instance	if	MSZP-PM	steps	back	in	four	more	districts
(in	favour	of	LMP	or	Jobbik),	they	would	stand	to	lose	half	of	their	public	funding.	It	seems	unlikely	parties	will
withdraw	candidates	when	it	means	losing	such	a	significant	amount	of	money.
Can	Fidesz	be	defeated?
The	possible	outcomes	can	be	framed	in	terms	of	the	two	ways	seats	are	awarded:	by	individual	district	mandates
and	party	lists.	In	the	first	case,	Fidesz’s	outcome	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	opposition	can	coordinate,
either	by	explicitly	withdrawing	lesser	candidates	or	encouraging	tactical	voting.	In	the	second	case,	high	turnout	will
favour	the	opposition	on	account	of	Fidesz’s	long	incumbency	and	broad	dissatisfaction	among	the	electorate.
Indeed,	the	Fidesz	campaign	is	rallying	its	core	voters,	not	making	converts.
If	opposition	coordination	does	not	materialise	and	turnout	is	low	(in	2014	it	was	62%),	Fidesz	may	win	another	two-
thirds	majority.	If	coordination	and	tactical	voting	are	effective	and	turnout	is	high	(in	2002	it	was	70%),	Fidesz’s
majority	would	be	endangered.	Popular	candidates	can	go	a	long	way	in	this	–	in	Hódmezővásárhely,	turnout
increased	by	26%.	An	intermediate	outcome	is	most	likely,	where	Fidesz	will	be	able	to	govern	alone	for	another	four
years,	though	without	a	two-thirds	majority.	In	fact,	Fidesz	has	already	lost	the	two-thirds	majority	it	won	at	the	last
election	due	to	losses	at	by-elections	during	the	legislative	period.
As	populist	parties	enter	government	in	multiple	European	countries,	Hungary	is	a	useful	example	to	study.
Importantly,	Fidesz	has	not	moderated	over	time.	As	its	power	is	threatened,	it	has	abandoned	economic	themes
and	doubled-down	on	nationalist	themes.	It	has	further	expanded	the	polarising	logic	of	competition	between	party
camps	within	the	country	to	a	wider	conflict	between	Hungary	and	the	EU.	Consequently,	international	attempts	to
intervene	when	laws	violate	European	regulations	are	framed	as	hostile	actions	against	the	country.
Fidesz	was	quick	in	changing	the	institutional	framework	of	Hungarian	democracy	and	other	countries	like	Poland
have	followed	some	of	these	reforms	–	in	turn	these	changes	could	have	a	large	impact	on	political	competition	in
these	countries.	In	sum,	the	2018	electoral	campaign	shows	how	defeating	populists	becomes	more	difficult	as	they
consolidate	their	power.	However,	it	also	shows	that	voters	remain	sensitive	to	the	performance	of	the	political
system	and	dissatisfaction	can	be	mobilised	by	the	opposition.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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